End of an infamous chapter?
The formation of the new autonomous self-governing body, BTC, is a move to bring peace to Assam’s Bodo inhabited areas. Bibhu Prasad Routray

WITH the surrender of 2641 cadres of the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) at Kokrajhar on December 6, 2003, and the subsequent swearing in of the 12-member interim Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) on December 7, an infamous chapter of Bodo insurgency in Assam comes to a close. The formation of the new autonomous self-governing body, BTC, after the failure of a similar attempt in the form of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) in 1993, is yet another move to bring peace to Assam’s Bodo inhabited areas, which have witnessed violent agitations and accompanying terrorist violence since 1987. After the Mizo Accord of 1986, the formation of the BTC could be the only and still qualified success story in the resolution of an insurgency in India’s North-East.

The BTC is being formed nine months after the signing of a Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) between the BLT leadership, the Union Government and the State Government of Assam on February 10, 2003. The main provisions of the MoS relate to the creation of the BTC within the State of Assam under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, to fulfill the economic, educational and linguistic aspirations, as well as the claims of the socio-cultural and ethnic identity of the Bodos in Assam (numbering 1,267,015 in the 1991 Census, more than 44 per cent of the State’s total population), and to speed up the development of infrastructure in the BTC area. The area of the proposed BTC will comprise of 3,082 identified villages, which will be divided into 4 contiguous districts after reorganization of the existing districts of Assam, subject to clearance of the Delimitation Commission. With the formation of the BTC, the Bodo struggle for development and good governance enters a decisive phase, creating new and onerous challenges for an inexperienced leadership. The transition of insurgent leaders into the arena of politics is bound to create at least a few problems. The BLT has already announced its intention of forming a political party to manage the BTC affair. However, sooner or later, the BLT leadership is bound to realise that running a democratic administration is a far more difficult task than planning ambushes against the security forces or killing civilians.

The distribution of spoils is also likely to create problems for the BTC leadership. Till now, Bodo organisations like the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and the Bodo People’s Action Committee (BPAC) sang in chorus with the BLT. Such unity is bound to face serious challenges as realpolitik takes over jungle camaraderie. The reality of life will also strike hard at the 2,641 BLT cadres, only some of whom can be accommodated within the limited BTC structure. With the plum posts going to senior functionaries, the euphoria of winning a war might give way to frustration. There have been many cases in the past when peace deals have led to the creation of new insurgent groups by disgruntled cadres.

The problem is accentuated by the fact that the State Government has ruled against providing a rehabilitation scheme for the BLT cadres, though a notification on November 27, 2003, announced a general amnesty and withdrawal of cases registered against persons related to the over-ground Bodo movement since 1987. According to the notification, there are 452 cases registered against the persons connected with such over-ground activity in as many as eight districts of Nalbari, Dhubri, Bongaigaon, Kokrajhar, Darrang, Barpeta, Kamrup and Sonitpur.

There is also need to guard against the notoriety of the BLT cadres. During the outfit’s parleys with the Union Government since July 1999, BLT cadres indulged in large-scale extortion and periodically orchestrated the selective elimination of their opponents. To cite an example, on January 27, 2003, suspected BLT cadres killed one of their former colleagues and four members of his family, including two women, at Duligaon in Dhubri district (the outfit subsequently denied its involvement in the incident). There is every chance of the BTC ending up institutionalising such outlaws on the line of the infamous SULFA (surrendered United Liberation Front of Asom or ULFA) cadres, who enjoyed State protection for a wide range of illegal activities through the 1990s, under successive Assam Governments.

Significantly, moreover, the pomp and show of the surrender ceremony, accompanied by great exhibition of Bodo paraphernalia, masks the rather poor acceptability level of the BLT leaders even among their own tribesmen. Few among the Bodo people know or are able to name any of the BLT leaders. Irrespective of the hype, the BTC generated, even in the remotest of the Bodo areas, people were uniformly skeptical of the leadership’s commitment to  development.

A seemingly formidable challenge is posed by the non-Bodo umbrella organisation, the Sanmilita Janagoshthiya Sangram Samiti (SJSS), which stands opposed to the Anglong district, an assurance to which effect is given in the MoS.

The most difficult challenge, however, comes from the active Bodo militant outfit, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), which finds itself marginalised with the finalisation of the BTC deal. The NDFB, fighting for an independent ‘Bodo hadat’ (Bodoland), has already issued statements asking people not to support the BTC, which they claim is not in the interest of the Bodo people. The Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Swami Chinmayananda was also reported to have said on December 6, 2003, that, “the security forces would do everything to ensure that they  (BLT cadres) were not victimised by the still active militant groups.” The grossly diminished military strength of the NDFB may, within this context, prove to be an advantage for the BLT as well as a matter of relief for the Union Government. There has been some speculation whether the formation of the BTC would lead to the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the NDFB renouncing the path of violence. The State Chief Minister, on December 6, 2003, took the opportunity to invite the ULFA and the NDFB to move in this direction, saying, “There is no problem so big that can not be resolved through talks.” However, while there is a possibility of individual NDFB cadres deciding to give up arms (21 of them surrendered recently), the group as a unit is likely to continue resisting attempts for peace. Given the fact that the BTC is an all-BLT affair, there would be little hope for the NDFB leadership or surrendered cadres to be accommodated in it. In the longer run, however, the performance of the BTC would decide the future and utility of violent groups like the NDFB. The possibility of ULFA agreeing to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the State also remains remote.

Under the circumstances, the BLT men who will take charge of the BTC will need support and patience not only from their own tribesmen and the non-tribals in the BTC area, but also from the State Government. There are a number of unresolved issues, such as the demarcation of the geographical boundary of the proposed Bodoland Territorial Area District (BTAD), comprising four districts - Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baska, and Udalguri (the last three are yet to be formed by the State Government) and the inclusion of additional villages.

These will need the cooperation of the State Government for a peaceful and early resolution.

There is a great deal at stake for the Union Government in the success of the BTC experiment. In addition to the resolution of the BLT brand of insurgency, the formation of the BTC could also be a test case before a plausible deal with the NSCN (IM) in Nagaland can be hammered out, excluding the Khaplang faction and the Naga National Council (NNC). Peace and development under a BTC manned by former BLT cadres in Bodoland may go some way in convincing the Central Government of the possibility of a durable peace in Nagaland, even if non-NSCN (IM) opinion is ignored. (The writer is the Acting Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati)

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